Many consider confirmation bias as one of the most pervasive phenomena in information processing, and the dismissal of information that challenges one’s views as a symptom of irrational mindsets (e.g., conspiracist thinking). We propose that blaming belief persistence on confirmation bias and close-mindedness is itself a form of motivated reasoning aimed at explaining why people persist in positions we disagree with. We examined how attitude content (congruent vs. incongruent with participants’ attitudes) and behaviors connoting confirmation bias (i.e., engaging with the opposite side’s arguments vs. avoiding them) influence the judgement of targets who persist in their beliefs in the face of attempts to sway their views.
Across studies, participants rated the target as much more irrationally close-minded (e.g., stubborn, pigheaded) when the target defended a position they disagreed (vs. agreed) with. Similarly, participants were much more likely to consider that the target was falling for confirmation bias when they disagreed with the target’s views. These effects of attitude congruence were independent from the effect of the target’s manipulated biased information seeking. Hence, individuals blame belief persistence on confirmation bias and irrationality mostly when they disagree with the persisting belief.